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Abstract 
Earlier studies have concluded that the use of self-reported health in retirement models is likely to yield an unreliable 
impact of health on retirement due to “justification bias”. A few recent studies based on younger cohorts approaching 
retirement age have found little support for this hypothesis. This paper adds fresh evidence to this debate by considering 
the effect of health on retirement plans in samples of older workers and retirees drawn from a Danish panel survey from 
1997-2002 merged to longitudinal register data. Using a wide array of alternative health measures, we compare the role 
of subjectively versus objectively measured health as a determinant of retirement planning. We control for unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as account for endogeneity and measurement error of health in retirement, and estimate separate 
models for women as well as men. As in the more studies, justification bias turns out not to be important. Self-rated 
physical and mental health are important predictors of retirement planning, in fact more important than economic 
factors, both among men as well as women. At a disaggregated level, back problems and myalgia significantly hasten 
male retirement, while back problems, osteoporosis and depression are conditions that significantly affect retirement 
among women. Retirement planning is in general unaffected by being hospitalised for a serious condition. Looking at 
health changes strengthens the conclusion that health is an important factor in retirement planning. In fact, health shocks 
seem to increase the propensity to retire earlier. However, health seems to be less important for retirement planning in 
Denmark compared to the US. 
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1. Introduction 
The future demographic changes that many countries around the world expect to face imply that it 
becomes increasingly important to add to our knowledge about the factors that affect the retirement 
decision. A number of previous studies have shown that health is an important determinant of 
preferences for retirement.  Much of the available empirical evidence in this area suggests that poor 
health causes workers to retire earlier (Bound, 1991; Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985, Bazzoli, 
1985; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; McGarry, 2002). Yet, from a theoretical perspective, poor health 
actually has an ambiguous effect on retirement (Sammartino, 1987).  In part, developing a health 
problem can reduce productivity at work by affecting work capacity.  In addition, workers may 
have to reduce hours or take sick days to attend to their health condition, which increases the value 
of leisure time relative to consumption.  On the other hand, poor health can increase the value of 
consumption relative to leisure at the margin if developing an acute condition means that the 
expected work life is shortened, so that the worker now has fewer years to allocate between 
retirement and work (Grossman, 1972).  While most previous studies have found that the former 
effects dominate the latter so that poor health brings on retirement, there is much disagreement as to 
the precise effects of health on retirement.  This is because various econometric issues arise when 
health is proxied by way of survey-based self-reports or even by more objectively measured 
indicators.  These issues have been detailed in a number of previous studies and therefore they are 
mentioned only briefly below (see for example, Benitez-Silva et al., 2000, Bound, 1991, Dwyer and 
Mitchell, 1999, and McGarry, 2002).    
 
Subjective reports of health made by those already retired may lead to potential “justification bias”. 
That is, failing health is used as a socially acceptable excuse for retirement, rather than an accurate 
description of the reason why individuals leave the labour market. This likely biases the estimated 
impact of health on labour market outcomes and introduces a bias in the coefficients of any 
variables correlated with health too. Another consideration is that health may be endogenous to 
labour market outcomes. This might lead to mis-estimation of the effect of health if, for instance, 
withdrawal from the labour market improves or worsens health. This is a direct effect leading to 
overestimation of the effect of health. An indirect effect is generated if unobserved differences 
across individuals correlate with both health and retirement behaviour, for example, differences in 
workers’ time rate of preference. The inability to control for these variables could lead to omitted 
variable bias. There may also be correlation between health status and financial aspects. Since   3
disability pension is only available for those who suffer from loss of working capability, some 
people will have a financial incentive to identify themselves as disabled, leading to a correlation 
between subjective health measures and financial variables. Thus, although the impact of health 
itself is correctly measured, the estimates of the impact of economic variables may be biased. Use 
of objective health measures might correct for this problem but objective health measures 
themselves may suffer from other problems, namely, that such health indicators need not 
necessarily measure the individual’s reduced ability to perform work, the relevant measure in any 
labour study.  In fact, in most cases, objective measures are proxies for general health or presence of 
health conditions rather than work capacity. For example, a measure such as subsequent mortality 
typically suffers from this measurement error problem, particularly as mortality often occurs 
abruptly or following a short-lived serious illness and is therefore not a good measure of current 
work capacity. Conversely, many chronic conditions such as arthritis may severely limit one’s 
ability to work, but have less of an effect on life expectancy, which may be important if workers 
form expectations taking into account their expected remaining time horizon. Finally, there need not 
be any relationship between the level of current health and retirement probabilities, if individuals 
and jobs are generally well matched so that employers tend to accommodate worker’s health 
problems at the workplace, or workers themselves undergo neutralizing treatment or lifestyle 
changes. Rather, it might be the onset of diseases or conditions, or sudden or gradual changes in 
health that likely influence retirement decisions. Therefore, in addition to analysing the effect of the 
level of health, the role of health changes is also examined. 
 
These considerations pose a considerable challenge to empirical economists interested in 
quantifying the impact of health on retirement and other labour market outcomes. Our main purpose 
is to assess the importance of precisely measured health relative to economic factors in particular, 
on planned retirement behaviour in Denmark taking careful account of the problems inherent in 
obtaining a precise estimate of health impacts outlined above. By combining a repeated survey of 
elderly individuals to longitudinal register data on labour market information, we are able to create 
a panel sample of older individuals for whom we have data on planned retirement age, health, 
income, job characteristics, labour market and background measures. This gives us a unique 
opportunity to quantify for the first time the effect of subjective as well as objective (including 
diagnostic-based) measures of health on retirement in Denmark. In doing so, we attempt to build 
upon the work in previous studies by taking into account various issues that arise in the   4 
measurement of health that were discussed above.  For instance, similar to McGarry (2002), by 
using repeated observations on planned retirement age we are able to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across individuals that may be correlated with both health and retirement and thereby 
cause omitted variable bias. However, going beyond McGarry, we also account for the endogeneity 
of health and measurement error as in Dwyer and Mitchell (1999), but within a framework of a 
panel model instead of the static model used in that study, allowing us to simultaneously account 
for both unobserved effects and endogeneity. Further, we employ a wide array of health measures in 
this study, both subjective and objective, including information of actual diagnoses made at the time 
of hospitalisation extracted from the Danish National Patient Registry (LPR, Landspatientregister). 
By employing a wide array of health measures, including self-rated physical and mental health, 
health compared to others, work capacity, work and functional limitations, presence of diseases 
conditions and episodes of hospitalisation caused by a serious condition, we are able to provide 
outer bounds on the “true” effect of health on retirement spanned by subjective and objective 
measures. This method has been suggested by Bound (1991) and has been implemented by Dwyer 
and Mitchell (1999) and Kreider and Pepper (2001, 2002).  In addition, one methodological 
improvement on previous studies is that in some specifications we experiment with a ordered probit 
panel model which allows for discontinuities in planned retirement age that may arise if the data are 
bunched around the early and normal retirement ages (see for example Figure 2 below).  Thus, we 
do not necessarily assume like previous studies (Dwyer (2001), Dwyer & Mitchell (1999) and 
Dwyer & Hu (1998)) that planned retirement age is a smoothly distributed variable.  Finally, and 
importantly, while most previous studies have concentrated on the impact of health on retirement 
behaviour of men, we conduct separate but symmetric analyses on samples of men as well as 
women, providing for the first time, precise estimates of the effects of health on female retirement. 
 
The focus in this study is to estimate the effect of health status on planned retirement age in 
Denmark, cf. above. Denmark is interesting in this context because unlike for instance health care 
arrangements in the US, under the Danish welfare system, health insurance is universal and access 
to most health services is free for all regardless of economic situation. In addition, health-related 
exit from the labour market is possible in Denmark through Social Disability Pension (SDP, 
førtidspension).
1 These differences between the two countries imply that we expect that health is a 
                                                 
1 SDP is residence based. Former work or contribution record is not required. To be awarded SDP, recipients must be 
18 to 66 years of age (18 to 64 from 2004). The basic pension is differentiated according to marital status and is means   5
less important factor in retirement planning in Denmark compared to the US. First, the universal 
system in Denmark might imply that older Danes in the labour force are healthier than similar 
American due to easier access to preventive and neutralizing health care services. Second, as a 
consequence of the existence of SDP, older Danes in the labour force probably constitute a more 
selected group than comparable Americans since older Danes with very poor health have already 
withdrawn themselves from the labour market. 
 
While earlier U.S. studies based on Retirement History Longitudinal Survey (RHS) data  
have concluded that the use of self-reported health in retirement models is likely to yield an 
unreliable impact of health on retirement due to the presence of “justification bias”, we find little 
support for the justification hypothesis in these data. Our findings are therefore more in line with 
the recent U.S. studies based on younger cohorts approaching retirement age drawn from the U.S. 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data (Benitez-Silva et al., 2000, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999, 
McGarry 2002).  We also find that self-rated physical and mental health are important predictors of 
retirement planning, in fact as important as economic factors, both among men as well as women.  
Again, these results confirm recent studies from the U.S. that find that health problems influence 
retirement plans more strongly than economic variables. For instance, Dwyer (2001) finds that 
economic factors such as net worth, pensions, and social security do not play a big role in 
retirement outcomes conditional on plans and McGarry (2002) finds that self-rated health in 
particular is a powerful predictor of retirement behaviour. Finally, as expected health seems to be a 
less important factor in retirement planning in Denmark than in the US. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some descriptive evidence and 
institutional background on health and retirement in Denmark.  Section 3 presents our empirical 
model, Section 4 the data and Section 5 the results of the estimation.  Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
tested against a wider range of other income sources. Conversely, the pension is complete independent of former work 
and income. In 2003, a reform of SDP was conducted with big simplification of the benefit structure. Before 2003, the 
pension was graduated according to loss of working capability and varied according to the age of the first time 
recipient.   6 
2. Health and retirement in Denmark 
In Denmark, as in most other OECD countries, the ageing of the population implies that the elderly 
will constitute an increasing share of the population in the coming decades. The projection for 
Denmark for the next 35 years is that there will be a decline in the number of people in the active 
population relative to the number aged 65 and above, from a ratio of 4.5 to l to a ratio of 3 to 1 (see 
Schaumann (2001)).  In a scenario of smaller entering birth cohorts and larger cohorts exiting to 
retirement, precise estimates of the effect of health on retirement become increasingly necessary in 
order for governments and policy planners to plan the right amount and types of investments in 
healthcare that would support an aging workforce.  
 
One important health-care systemic difference compared to for instance the U.S. is that health care 
services in Denmark are publicly financed through general income taxes and for most of the 
services, offered directly by the public authorities. Thus, unlike in the U.S. where availability of 
insurance is an important predictor of retirement, health insurance is as mentioned above universal 
and access to most health services is free for all regardless of economic situation.  
 
Health-related exit from the labour market is possible through SDP, cf. Section 1. At the end of 
2002, 7 per cent of people aged 18-66 years received SDP. Among the 50-59-year-olds, the share 
was 12 per cent. This share was about the same in the middle of the 1980’s, cf. Figure 1 below. 
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Early retirement though SDP is most prevalent among women in this age group. As SDP in 
Denmark in the decades of the 1980s incorporated as well retirement for individuals who fulfilled 
certain social criteria, the share of men and the share of women increased in the eighties.  For 
women, the cancellation of the widow’s pension in 1984 contributed to a corresponding take-up of 
SDP, particularly among widowed women.  However, in the nineties, the share of women in 
disability decreased much more than the share of men. That is, the share of women decreased 8 per 
cent from 1984 to 2002, while the share of men increased 12 per cent. Part of the explanation of this 
gender difference might be the prevalence of the Transitional Benefit Program (TBP, 
overgangsydelse) in the mid-nineties that was available for people aged 55-59 years (from 1994 
also 50-54-year-olds) who were members of an unemployment insurance fund and who had been 
unemployed for at least 12 out of the last 15 months. The existence of this scheme probably 
contributed to the reduction in the inflow of people in to SDP. In particular, the inflow of women 
was reduced since two out of three individuals who received TBP benefits were women. During the 
1990s, changes made to improve work-disabled peoples’ attachment to work evolved around the 
idea of ‘activation’. Thus, by emphasizing active measures such as vocational rehabilitation, the 
dependency on social security benefits was reduced, cf. Høgelund (2003). Furthermore, subsidized 
jobs on special terms were introduced in the late nineties as a means of reducing the inflow to SDP 
of people of working age (fleksjob) and to increase the labour force by enabling SDP pensioners to 
re-enter the labour force at the same time as they maintain their SDP benefits (skånejob). These 
policy changes also contributed to the decrease until 2001 in the share of men and women that 
received SDP benefits. However, these shares increased from 2001-2002. This trend, which was 
seen across age groups, seems to be due to an effort by the municipalities directed towards closing 
as many cases as possible before a reform of the SDP came into force 1 January 2003. Comparable 
trends are seen in connection with an earlier reform within this area, cf. National Social Appeals 
Board (2003). SDP is relatively expensive for the government. Thus, the cost of this program 
amounted to 2.2 per thousand relative to GNP in 2002. SDP benefits to people aged 50 or above 
amounted to 1.4 per thousand. By way of comparison, it is worth mentioning that the cost of Old 
Age Pension (OAP, folkepension) and early retirement schemes
2 amounted to 4.2 and 1.6 per 
thousand, respectively. 
 
                                                 
2 In this context, early retirement schemes include TBP and Post Employment Wage (PEW, efterløn), cf. the description 
of the latter in Section 4.   8 
A few previous Danish studies have also estimated the effect of health on retirement, employing 
either duration or option-value models of retirement. The general finding seems to be that bad 
health affects early retirement positively. However, while Christensen & Datta Gupta (2000) and 
Pedersen & Smith (1996) show that bad health has a positive impact on early retirement for both 
men and women, Danø et al. (1998, 2000) find that bad health seems to hasten retirement for men, 
while the effect is insignificant for women.  The first two studies define their health measure on a 
single index, which is based on whether or not the worker qualifies for sickness insurance, typically 
granted after a sickness spell of a minimum of 13 weeks. The study by Danø et al. base health on 
the number of physician visits in a year, not accounting for the reason for visit. None of these 
studies however takes into account the issues of endogeneity and measurement error of health. 
 
3. Empirical model  
Following Bound (1991), Dywer and Mitchell (1999) and other previous studies, we consider a 
model of the retirement decision of individuals approaching retirement age, in which the 
(continuous) planned retirement age of individual i at time t, Rit, depends on economic factors, 
health status and demographic variables: 




* is unobserved health status, w are economic incentive variables, Z are demographic factors and ε 
is a random disturbance term.  Although H
* is unknown, we observe alternative proxies of 
underlying health, a subjective measure, H
s, and an objective measure, H
o.  The subjective measure 
depends both on underlying health status H
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* is orthogonal to ε, µ
s and µ
o. If “justification bias” is present, then ε and µ
s are 
correlated. For example, an individual planning to retire earlier than average may try to justify this 
by reporting themselves to be in worse than average health, leading to simultaneity bias. Another 
problem is that as H
s is not a perfect predictor of H
*, measurement error will bias the coefficient to   9
H
*, γ.  Bound (1991) shows that as long as the correlation between ε and µ
s is positive, it will tend 
to bias the coefficient to H
*, γ, upwards, while variance in µ
s leads to the classic errors-in-variables 
problem and will tend to bias it downwards.  The net effect on γ depends on the relative magnitudes 
of these two biases, but even if on balance they cancel out, there will in general still exist a 
downward bias on β arising from the dependence of H
s on w i.e. δ. This means, that while the 
coefficient to the subjective proxy despite the rationalization problem may end up in practice close 
to the true effect of health on retirement, the coefficients to the economic variables will tend to be 
smaller than they should be.   
 
There are problems inherent in using the objective measures as well. Here, justification bias is not 
present, µ
o is uncorrelated with ε, and further, H
o is not dependent on w, but as long as it is not a 
perfect predictor of underlying health, the use of it will tend to underestimate the effect of health 
and overestimate the effects of economic variables. Solutions to identification may lie in finding 
instruments for the subjective and objective measure (Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). Or, in limiting 
the analysis to a sample of workers only (McGarry (2002)). Other solutions could be to find 
exogenous sources of variation in w or changes in the structure of retirement benefits that could 
identify the underlying parameters, or even in using information on the reliability of self-reports.  In 
this paper, we employ the instrumental variables (IV) method to solve the identification issues 
discussed above.  
 
More recently, as subsequent waves of the HRS have become available, some authors have applied 
longitudinal data to the question of the effect of health on retirement plans.  McGarry (2002) 
estimates a fixed effects model of the subjective probability of continued work on workers only and 
finds strong effects of subjective measures of health even on a sample for which justification bias is 
purportedly low.  While the use of longitudinal data in itself does not solve the identification issues 
that arise in the cross section, it does allow purging the data of unobserved individual effects, which 
may be correlated with health and retirement. Examples of such effects mentioned by McGarry 
(2002) may be individual’s time-rate of discount, tastes for work or even time-constant 
measurement error in health.  The fixed effects model allows for individual effects to be correlated 
with the included variable.  However, the effects are estimated as strict parametric shifts of the 
outcome function. Thus, the model is more appropriately applied to settings in which the sample 
constitutes the population under study, for example, an inter-country comparison which includes the   10 
full set of countries, cf. Greene (2003, p. 293). As most labour studies are based on smaller samples 
drawn from a large population, a more appropriate econometric specification models the error term 
as randomly distributed across individuals i.e. the random effects model, and therefore this model is 
the chosen statistical framework.
3  Pooled OLS and random effects models are tested against each 
other by way of Breusch-Pagan LM and likelihood ratio tests, which are based on OLS and random 
effects residuals respectively, as tests of the random effects. 
 
The econometric model is specified as follows.  In the case of subjective health measures, we have 
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3 However, the random effects model is restrictive in that the unobserved individual effect is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the included regressors, and in fact, a Hausman specification test shows that this assumption is only fulfilled in the 
case of men. However, the fixed effects approach which allows correlation between the unobserved component and the 
observed variables, is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost which is particular problematic in our case since our 
sample is small and since T is equal to 2. Consequently, using fixed effects in this case corresponds to throwing away 
half of the observations. The problem is illustrated by the fact that although Hausman specification test suggests that 
both the fixed and the random effects approach are consistent in the case of men, results based on these two approaches 
differ considerably. In fact, very few of the estimates based on the fixed effects approach are significant, while several 
of the estimates from the random effects specification are significant and have the expected signs. The results for 
women based on the fixed effects approach suffer from similar problems (see footnote 11).   11
Note that as true health status H
* is unobserved, the subjective and objective health measures are 
used alternatively as proxies for it.  However, to account for the endogeneity and measurement 
error, we employ an instrumental variables estimation approach where Y are a set of exogenous 
instruments spanning the relevant health measure.  The parameters of this random effects IV model 
are derived by way of the full-information G2SLS estimator developed by Balestra and 
Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987). 
 
If justification bias is present, then subjective health measures should have a big impact and 
economic variables a small impact on planned retirement age.  In that case, instrumentation should 
reduce the impact of the subjective variables and increase the relative importance of the economic 
variables.  On the other hand, if measurement error is a problem with respect to the objective 
measures, then the impact of health will be small and economic effects big, and instrumentation 
should increase health effects and reduce effects of economic variables on planned retirement.   
 
4. Data and descriptives 
The primary data used in this study are obtained from a longitudinal database of elderly people 
(Ældredatabasen), a survey which was fielded and collected by the Danish National Institute of 
Social Research.  The database consists of two waves of survey data from 1997 and 2002. Thus, 
repeated observations over time enable us to obtain knowledge about how individuals update their 
retirement plans when new information arrives, particularly with respect to the role of health on 
planned retirement age. The survey data are merged with longitudinal register data from 1993 to 
2001, in order to supplement the database with information on individual’s labour market 
characteristics (the economic variables). 
 
The first survey was conducted in 1997 face-to-face in the homes of a representative sample of 
individuals born every fifth year from 1920 to 1945. 5,864 individuals from the six cohorts were 
interviewed. The response rate was 70 per cent. The second survey was conducted primarily by 
phone. The same respondents were contacted for a second interview.
4 79 per cent of the first wave 
respondents participated in the second wave. Thus, 4,634 individuals form part of both waves. 
 
                                                 
4 In addition, a representative sample of individuals born in 1950 and new respondents born every fifth year from 1920 
to 1945 to replace the attrition in the first wave were contacted for an interview.   12 
In order to minimize sample selection due to retirement, the sample used in this paper is limited to 
individuals born in 1940 and 1945. That is, people aged approximately 52 and 57 years in 1997, 
which corresponds to 2,259 individuals, who are observed again in 2002. The sample is restricted to 
individuals that were in the labour force in the first wave. Thus, one source of potential sample 
selection is that we omit individuals who were already retired in 1997. This exclusion of individuals 
outside the labour force in Wave 1 can be problematic if transition to SDP and early retirement 
schemes are self-chosen.  However, we lack key information on some health measures and many 
relevant economic characteristics (see Appendix A3, Table A1), which therefore does not allow the 
possibility of including these individuals in the analysis.  Instead, a full comparison of means is 
made of those in the labour force in Wave 1 to those out of the labour force in Wave 1. Note that we 
do include individuals who retired between the two waves in our sample, for purposes of 
maximizing sample size, as we have full information on all covariates on these individuals.
5  These 
restrictions leave us with a sample of 1,834 individuals. Finally, since we  compare retirement plans 
in 1997 and 2002 we are only able to include individuals that report a given age in both  years when 
asked about planned retirement age, see below. Unfortunately, a large share of individuals does not 
meet this demand
6 and therefore, we end up with a sample that consists of 1,103 individuals. That 
is, 49 per cent of the original sample. 
 
Planned retirement age is the dependent variable in our analyses. We treat this generally as a 
continuously distributed variable, but we do sensitivity analysis in which this variable is grouped to 
account for the concentrations of responses at age 60, 62 and 65, cf. Figure 2 below, which in turn 
reflect pension policy rules and eligibility criteria. Thus, we distinguish between six categories of 
planned retirement age: below 60, 60-61, 62, 63-64, 65-66 and 67 and above. Ages 60 and 67 were 
the early and the normal retirement ages in 1997, respectively. Furthermore, if people waited until 
the age of 63 to take up PEW, benefits were increased. In 2002, the incentives to retire at age 62 
                                                 
5 Planned retirement age is set equal to the actual retirement age (reported in the survey) for these individuals. 
6 Instead, their answer was “don’t know” or “as long as possible”. It is of course feasible to set “as long as possible” to a 
maximum of 75 or 85 years, for instance, as in some previous studies (Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). However, we 
hesitate to do so, as this latter group of individuals turns out to be a very heterogeneous group whose characteristics do 
not in general resemble those who cite a high retirement age when queried. Nevertheless, as a check of the robustness of 
the results, “as long as possible” is tentatively set equal to 75, on the assumption that that people enjoy working and 
want to maintain a relationship to the labour market as long as possible, and in an alternative experiment, to 67, which 
might apply if people are financially constrainted and would therefore need to continue working until the normal 
retirement age. By including individuals that answer “as long as possible”, the sample size increases from 1103 to 1331 
individuals. However, including these individuals does not change the estimates of any of the health coefficients 
significantly using either definition.   13
were strengthened. Thus, changes in PEW, which is the most popular early retirement scheme in 
Denmark, were put in effect in 1999. Among other changes, means testing of benefits against 
income from labour market pension and lump sum retirement income payment for people aged 60 
and 61 were introduced. A tax premium was introduced as well for people that were entitled to 
PEW benefits at age 60 but who continued working until at least the age of 62. At the same time, it 
was decided that the official age of retirement would be lowered from 67 to 65 years of age from 
2004. Thus, in 2002 the normal retirement age was 65 for the individuals in our survey. 
 
A large shift in planned retirement age took place from 1997 to 2002 among the individuals in our 
sample, cf. Figure 2. In 1997, retirement around the early retirement age was more or less the norm 
among women in particular but also among men born in 1945. However, from 1997 to 2002 the 
shares of individuals that planned to retire at age 60 and to a minor degree at age 67 decreased, 
while the shares that planned to retire at age 62 and 65 respectively increased. The shift to planned 
retirement at age 65 was most pronounced among people born in 1940, while the shift to planned 
retirement at age 62 first took place among people born in 1945. In general, the changes were most 
pronounced for men. Part of the changes in planned retirement is probably due to the upward 
adjustment that normally takes place, when people approach retirement age, cf. e.g. Dwyer & Hu 
(1999). However, it also seems reasonable to believe that these changes at least to some extent 
reflect the policy changes described above. 
 
Figure 2. Planned retirement age 1997 and actual and planned retirement age 1998-2002, per 
cent, (a) men born in 1940; (b) women born in 1940; (c) men born in 1945; (d) women born in 
1945. 
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It is potentially difficult to isolate the effect of health on retirement plans in an environment in 
which changes in pension policy are taking place simultaneously.  However, as the pension wealth 
accrual variable is updated to reflect the expected value of the pension policy change and given that 
the correlation between changes in pension policy and health is small, we are able to identify the 




Definitions of the explanatory variables included in the analyses are provided in Table A1 in  
Appendix A3. Poor health is proxied alternatively by 8 separate measures, 4 subjective and 4 
objective.  The subjective variables are self-reported general health, self-reported mental health, 
self-rated health compared to others and self-rated work capacity.  Among the objective measures, 
we have the presence of work limitations, the presence of functional limitations, the presence of a 
disease condition and the most objective measure of all, presence of a (serious) condition diagnosed 
at the time of hospitalisation, based on information obtained from LPR records and merged to the 
panel sample.
8 A detailed description of health measures can be found in Appendix A3, Table A1. 
Other key explanatory variables include individual labour market earnings and other income, wealth 
and a variable capturing pension wealth accrual measured as a replacement rate, the compensation 
rate (see Appendix A2 for a description of how the compensation rate is calculated). Additional 
                                                 
7 One source of correlation between health and pension policy reform could be if individuals are more likely to report 
themselves in poor health following a pension reform that increases eligibility age in an attempt to justify early exit.  
However, the PEW reform of 1999 kept the first available age of early retirement at 60 but simply increased (the 
already present) financial incentives of later retirement at age 62 or later. Thus, retirement at 60 is still a legally 
available and much used option and there are no social stigma attached to retiring at 60. The reform merely makes it 
more financially attractive for individual to defer retirement age to 62 or later.      
8 Instead of 0-1 dummies, counts of disease conditions, diagnoses and work limitations have been tried and results 
remain robust to these alternative specifications.   15
controls include birth cohort (1940 or 1945), vocational education, cohabitation status, age 
difference between partners, experience, occupation, sector, tenure, hours of work, whether the job 
is physical demanding, level of job satisfaction and a dummy variable for missing compensation 
rate. 
 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are also included in Table A1. Looking at gender 
differences among the individuals in the labour force in Wave 1 (the estimation sample), planned 
retirement age is significantly higher for men (61.68) than women (60.86) in our sample, but for 
both groups, on average, individuals in the labour force plan to retire through some form of an early 
retirement program.  The mean values for general health are similar by gender with 17% of women 
and 18% of men reporting themselves to be in poor health and 5% of each gender group rating their 
health to be worse than others.  However, women report having significantly worse mental health 
than men, and a higher share of women report having functional limitations that bother them in their 
daily life. Also, more women than men are bothered by at least one disease condition, particularly, 
osteoarthritis, myalgia, osteoporosis and depression.  Conversely, men to a larger extent are 
hospitalised with a serious condition and are more likely to be diagnosed with heart diseases, 
diabetes and high blood pressure than women.  As regards the remainder variables in our model, 
more men than women are vocationally trained, and more women than men live alone, reflecting in 
part gender mortality differences. Turning to financial and job characteristics, men have higher 
earnings and other income and higher average wealth, although the dispersion in the wealth variable 
within the group of men is much larger. Conversely, the compensation rate from pensions is on 
average expected to be higher for women than for men when withdrawal takes place, indicating that 
women’s labour market earnings and other income is typically lower. Unsurprisingly, men have 
higher experience, tenure and a longer working week than women on average. In terms of 
occupation of the job with the longest tenure, the average male in our sample to a greater extent has 
been self-employed/assisting spouse or a skilled/unskilled worker, while the typical women has 
been a salaried worker or a public servant. 
 
Turning next to in-out of-labour force differences, we see that both men and women outside the 
labour force have significantly worse health as measured by all the self-reported subjective proxies, 
as well as in terms of having any functional limitation, disease or diagnosed condition (including 
heart conditions, strokes, lung diseases for men, and heart conditions, lung diseases, diabetes and   16 
arthritis for women). The finding of poorer self-reported health among the individuals outside the 
labour force supports the justification bias hypothesis. On the other hand, that fact that individuals 
outside the labour force tend to suffer more from underlying diseases and diagnosed conditions, 
imply that they are to some extent probably in worse health than individuals in the labour force. 
Mean age is also higher in this group than corresponding men and women in the labour force. In 
addition, men outside the labour force have considerably less higher education, are more likely to 
live alone, have lower income on average, considerably less wealth and less labour market 
experience than men in the labour force. Similarly, women outside the labour force have less 
vocational training, and a significantly lower fraction of them have higher education.  They are also 
more likely to be living alone or have a partner who is the same age or younger (baseline is having 
an older partner), have lower average income and wealth and less experience than their counterparts 
in the labour force. In sum, there are sufficiently many differences between the two groups, 
indicating that our findings should be appropriately applied to individuals approaching retirement 
age rather than those who have already withdrawn themselves from the labour market.  On the other 
hand, the descriptive evidence also indicates that by excluding the already retired in Wave 1, the 
estimated impact of health on retirement is less likely to reflect justification bias. 
 
Correlations between health measures are shown in Appendix A3, Table A2 for men, and A3 for 
women. In general, correlations between measures are not high except for a few notable exceptions. 
The correlations between self-reported measures appear higher (upper left quadrant), for instance 
for men (women), the correlation between general health and mental health is 0.32 (0.24) and 
between general health and health compared to others is 0.38 (0.41) which suggests that these 
should be considered as alternative ways of measuring individuals’ underlying health.  On the other 
hand, correlations between the (self-reported) diseases conditions appear small except for 
conditions that affect the same part of body or system or share the same pathological causes for 
example, between back problems and myalgia or back problems and osteoarthritis. There appears to 
be no correlation between individual diagnosed conditions.  However, both for diseases conditions 
as well as diagnosed conditions, the aggregated variable that is defined to be the presence or 
absence of any condition, is correlated with the separate components.  Overall, these considerations 
point to treating the various available measures as alternative proxies for underlying health.  
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5. Results of estimation 
Results of the analysis of the factors that affect retirement planning are presented in Tables 1-20. In 




5.1. Pooled OLS analysis 
To examine the role of health in retirement planning, pooled OLS models are estimated for men and 
women separately, as a benchmark case against a more general model that accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity in Section 5.2.  The findings from this simple specification in which the various 
health measures (subjective and objective) are treated as alternative proxies for underlying health 
H
*, show that being in poor health in general reduces planned retirement age for men and women as 
almost all measures of poor health are estimated to have negative impacts on retirement age, cf. 
Table 1 and 2 below. In contrast, as may be expected, higher income increases planned retirement 
age for both men and women while greater wealth and a higher compensation rate of pensions 
reduce it for men.
10 That is, individuals that were wealthy in the year prior to the survey year are 
more inclined to precipitate retirement than others. However, this result only applies to men.  For 
women, while wealth in most cases has the usual negative effect, the compensation rate has 
unexpectedly positive effects on planned retirement age, but in general, neither of these effects is 
significant.  Interestingly, for both men and women, economic factors are highly stable and are 
estimated to have the same impacts irrespective of the health measure being considered, indicating 
an absence of correlation between health and these factors.  
 
The subjective health measures are in general highly significant, while the objective measures not, 
and this holds for both men and women.  The only objective measures that are significant are 
                                                 
9 Estimated coefficients on the other explanatory variables are available and can be provided on request. 
10 Other factors also affect planned retirement age. In this case, the results are very similar for men and women. As 
expected, adjustment in an upward direction takes place, when people approach retirement age. Unsurprisingly, people 
with higher education are more inclined to increase their planned retirement age than people without any qualifying 
education. Further, an increase in job satisfaction increases the planned retirement age as expected while an increase in 
the physical job demands decreases this age. Women living alone are more inclined to increase their planned retirement 
age than partnered women. This result probably reflects that single women have a greater preference for work than 
married women, see also Larsen (2004). Finally, planned retirement age is lower for men with a partner about the same 
age or younger. A potential explanation is that the desire to retire is stronger when one’s partner is expected to retire at 
the same time or before oneself. 
 
   18 
having a disease condition for men, and the presence of work limitations for women.  On the face of 
it, this result could match the predictions by Bound (1991) that subjective measures tend to be 
inflated in the presence of justification bias while objective measures are weakened by 
measurement error. A formal test of this hypothesis is carried out in Section 5.3 where endogeneity 
and/or measurement error in health is corrected for by way of IV analysis.   
 
Table 1. Pooled OLS estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on men’s 
retirement age. 


















































































2  16.1 13.1 13.4 12.8 12.4 12.4 13.6 12.5
Number of obs.  1224 
Note: Additional controls include birth cohort, education, cohabitation status, age differences between partners, 
experience, occupation, sector, tenure, hours of work, whether job is physical demanding, job satisfaction level and 
dummy variable for missing compensation rate. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant 
at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 2. Pooled OLS estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on women’s 
retirement age. 




















































































2  16.0 15.5 14.9 16.1 15.0 14.8 14.6 14.6
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 1 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
How does health compare to economic factors? To be able to compare the predicted estimates, we 
standardize changes in the continuous explanatory variables by computing the estimated impacts on 
planned retirement age of a 1 standard deviation change in each explanatory variable.  We find for 
men, focusing only on the significant variables, a one standard deviation increase in (log) income 
increases planned retirement age by 0.33-0.35 years, while a one standard deviation increase in   19
wealth reduces it by 0.14-0.16 years. Looking next at the estimated coefficients on the health 
measures that are significant, being in poor general health reduces men’s planned retirement age by 
1.4 years, while a one-unit worsening in mental health or being in worse health than others reduces 
planned retirement age by 1.3 years. A one-point decrease in working capacity (10-point scale) 
reduces planned retirement age by 0.13 years while being hospitalised for a serious condition 
reduces planned retirement age by 0.72 years. Thus, except for the work capacity, health seems to 
have a larger impact than wealth or income. Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) also find that health effects 
are larger than economic incentive effects in a similar analysis based on cross-sectional HRS data.  
In their study, those in poor health plan to retire about 2 years earlier than those in better health. 
Thus, (general) health effects are about half as strong in Denmark. In other words, our expectation 
that health is a less important factor in Denmark compared to the US seems to be confirmed. 
 
For women, a one standard deviation increase in income increases planned retirement age by 
between 0.20-0.24 years, while wealth and compensation effects are not significant. Being in poor 
general health reduces female retirement age by about 8 months, a one point increase in the (poor) 
mental health index reduces it by 1.07 years, while being in worse health than others reduces 
planned retirement age by two-thirds of a year. A one-point increase in working incapacity reduces 
planned retirement age by 0.18 years while having at least one limitation that affects work reduces 
retirement age by little more than 1/3 of a year. Having a disease condition or being hospitalised for 
a serious condition does not significantly impact women’s planned retirement age. Here again, the 
significant health effects are stronger than income effects on retirement. However, health effects are 
not as strong as those for men. 
 
5.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
In this section, results from the random effects specification are reported and compared to the 
simple pooled OLS model in Section 5.1 by way of Breusch-Pagan LM and likelihood ratio tests. In 
all models considered, for both men and women, the Breusch-Pagan LM and the likelihood ratio 
test statistics reported in Tables 3 and 4 below clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
unobserved heterogeneity is strongly rejected.  Results from the random effects specification on the 
health variables are qualitatively similar to those derived from a pooled OLS model, indicating that 
unobserved heterogeneity, although present, is not large in the case of the health variables.  For 
men, one difference seems to be that working incapacity is no longer a significant determinant of   20 
retirement planning. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity seems to be more important in the 
case of the economic variables.  For example, for men, wealth and the compensation rate are now 
estimated to have smaller impacts than before, roughly half the magnitude of the OLS effects. The 
relative importance of health to income is unchanged, while health becomes even more important 
compared to wealth and the compensation rate. The precise effects of health can be summarized as 
follows: For men, being in poor general health reduces planned retirement age by 1.3 years, while a 
one-point increase in the (poor) mental health index reduces planned retirement age by 1.2 years. 
Having health worse than others decreases planned age of retirement by 1.2 years while having a 
diseases condition means that males adjust their planned retirement age down by about ½ a year. In 
comparison, a one standard deviation increase in (log) income increases planned retirement age by 
0.33-0.35 years. 
 
Table 3. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on men's 
retirement age. 


















































































2  (overall)  16.8 13.9 14.2 13.4 13.2 13.2 14.3 13.2
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  101.6*** 109.8*** 109.0*** 106.5*** 110.8*** 111.2*** 104.6*** 111.9***
Likelihood ratio test  116.7***  126.8*** 125.8*** 124.3*** 128.6*** 128.9*** 121.4*** 130.0***
Number of obs.  1224 
The likelihood ratio tests are obtained from the maximum-likelihood random-effects estimator, which produce estimates 
that are very nearly the same as those produced by the full-information G2SLS estimator. See also Table 1 for notes.  
* Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table 4. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on women's 
retirement age. 



















































































  17.4 16.9 16.4 17.5 16.4 16.3 16.1 16.1
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  66.0*** 65.6*** 67.6*** 63.3*** 66.4*** 67.4*** 68.5*** 68.5***
Likelihood ratio test  71.8***  71.4*** 73.7*** 68.9*** 72.5*** 73.5*** 74.7*** 74.8***
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
For women, purging the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, make wealth effects considerably 
larger and of the right sign (negative). Income effects are slightly smaller and the compensation rate 
is about the same magnitude as before and remains positive but insignificant. Health effects remain 
roughly the same as before, except that having health worse than others and work limitations are no 
longer significant at the 5% level, so that only subjective health measures impact retirement 
planning.  The precise impacts are as follows: Being in bad health leads to a decrease in the planned 
retirement age by about 8 months. A one-point increase in the (poor) mental health index reduces 
planned retirement age by little short of a year while a one-point increase in working incapacity 
reduces the planned age by about 2 months. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in 
(log) income increases planned retirement age by between 0.17-0.19 years. As before, poor health 
affects men’s retirement planning more strongly than it does women’s.
11  
                                                 
11 A fixed effects estimation is also tried as explained in footnote 4, and a Hausman specification test fails to reject the 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors for women, but not for men. Based on 
the fixed effects IV results for women, we find that neither endogeneity nor measurement error is of obvious 
importance. Results derived from simple fixed effects estimation suggest that only poor general health has a significant 
effect on retirement plans for women but this result is only marginally significant (10% level). Poor general health is 
found to lower women’s planned retirement age by 8 months. In addition, diseases conditions such as osteoporosis and 
being hospitalised for heart conditions are both found to hasten retirement by more than 2 years. However, the effect of 
heart conditions is only marginally significant.    22 
Table 5. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on men’s 
retirement age. Working sample only. 


















































































2  (overall)  23.3 20.5 20.7 20.0 19.7 19.7 20.8 19.8
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  48*** 54*** 54*** 51*** 54*** 54*** 51*** 55***
Likelihood  ratio  test  61*** 68*** 68*** 66*** 68*** 69*** 64*** 70***
Number of obs.  884 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 6. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on women's 
retirement age. Working sample only. 



















































































2  (overall)  23.1 22.6 22.4 22.9 22.6 22.2 22.2 22.3
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  27*** 27*** 27*** 26*** 26*** 28*** 27*** 28***
Likelihood  ratio  test  30*** 30*** 30*** 29*** 28*** 30*** 30*** 31***
Number of obs.  652 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
5.3 Workers only 
Although the sample from the start is restricted to those individuals who were in the labour force in 
the first survey year (1997), the preceding analysis also includes those individuals who retired 
between the two survey years.  One way to minimize justification bias would be to restrict the 
analysis to individuals who remain in the workforce in both years, as retired individuals are more 
likely to cite failing health as a reason for quitting work.  McGarry (2002) uses this strategy and 
argues that the estimates of the impact of subjective health measures on the probability of continued 
work cannot be attributed to justification bias when the focus is exclusively on workers. To test this 
hypothesis, in Tables 5 and 6 above we re-estimate the random effects model on workers only and 
compare it to the previous findings in Tables 3 and 4. Focusing only on the subjective health   23
measures in these tables, as expected, coefficients are slightly smaller in magnitude when non-
workers are excluded, particularly for females, indicating that there may exist some potential 
justification bias in the self-reported health measures. However, not all economic variables are 
estimated to be larger here, only wealth and compensation rate for men, and income and wealth for 
women. 
 
Table 7. Random effects IV estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on men’s 
retirement age. 


















































































2  (overall)  16.6 10.2 13.0 8.7 5.3 9.9 12.5 12.6
Hausman test of 
exogeneity  0.63 2.51 1.57 1.94 2.94 1.79 3.32 1.32
Number of obs.  1224 
See Table 1 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 8. Random effects IV estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on women's 
retirement age. 


















































































2  (overall)  15.3 15.3 16.2 17.4 14.2 10.5 14.2 16.1
Hausman test of  
exogeneity 1.48  1.25  n.a. 0.59 0.79 2.28 n.a. n.a.
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 1 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
5.4 Endogeneity and measurement error 
A more fundamental statistical method of correction for justification bias is to account for the 
endogeneity of health in retirement. Tables 7 and 8 above report panel IV estimates of the effect of 
health and economic variables on retirement. The advantage of the IV approach is that problems of   24 
endogeneity (affecting the subjective measures) and measurement error in health (affecting mainly 
the objective measures) are rectified once health is instrumented for.
12 In terms of appropriate 
instruments that could be correlated with health but uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the 
retirement equation, we use parental mortality status, number of discharges, number of doctor visits 
per year, assistance with home work, assistance with transportation and unique information on 
accidents as well as a variable denoting the amount of exercise the individual gets.
13 A detailed 
description of the instruments is provided in Appendix A1. First-stage results can be seen in 
Appendix A3, Tables A4 (men) and A5 (women). For each of the health measures considered, we 
perform chi-squared tests of the power of the instruments and in every case we are able to reject the 
null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the instruments at the 0.1-5% level (see Tables A4 and 
A5). Further, the instruments affect health in the expected directions in the majority of cases: 
having a parent alive is associated with better health, while the greater the number of discharges and 
doctors’ visits, the poorer is health. Individuals requiring assistance with homework or 
transportation in general have poorer health as do individuals who experience accidents. The result 
on the no exercise variable is consistent with poor health for men, although yields mixed results for 
women. 
 
The results of the panel IV estimation are shown in Tables 7 and 8 and can be compared to the 
panel model without endogeneity in Tables 3 and 4. If justification bias is present, then IV estimates 
of the subjective health measures that are corrected for this type of endogeneity should be smaller 
than those from the model which treats health as exogenous. This is apparently not the case as in 
each gender group, the panel IV estimates on the subjective measures are larger in magnitude than 
those obtained from simple random effects estimations. On the other hand, if measurement error is 
present, then the random effects IV estimates of the objective measures that are corrected for this 
type of error should be larger than those from the simple random effects. This is evidenced in 
Tables 7 and 8, where for almost all objective measures, for both men and women, random effects 
IV estimates are indeed larger. Fewer health measures are significant in the random effects IV 
                                                 
12 This approach is used by Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) but in a static model.  
13 One might argue that the number of physician visits is not exogenous. First, frequent visits at a doctor might be one 
way of justifying early retirement. Second, if the process of applying for SDP involves one or more doctor visits, 
planned retirement and doctor visits might be correlated. Therefore, as a check of robustness of the results the number 
of doctor visits is eliminated as an instrument. However, the only change is that the chi-squared test of the power of the 
instruments fails to reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the instruments in 1 out of the 8 health outcome 
equations (the work limitation regression) for women.   25
compared to the simple random effects estimates. However, and more fundamentally, Hausman 
tests of exogeneity fail to reject the null hypothesis in the case of each health measure considered 
(see bottom rows in Tables 7 and 8), that both the simple random effects and the random effects IV 
estimators are consistent. 
 
In order to check the robustness of the IV estimates, tests of overidentifying restrictions are 
conducted, see Table A6 for men and Table A7 for women in Appendix A3. For each of the health 
measures considered, we estimate specifications in which one instrument or group of instruments is 
eliminated in turn and compare these results to the estimates obtained when all instruments are 
included. In case of men as well as women, the parameter estimates are remarkably stable. The 
estimate for each of the health measures is found to be negative and similar in magnitudes in almost 
all specifications. Further, in all cases Hausman test of exogeneity fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that both the simple random effects and the random effects IV estimates are consistent. 
 
The results indicate that issues of correlation between health and the disturbance term in the 
retirement equation or measurement error in health are not of obvious importance here and that 
therefore the ordinary random effects estimates are preferable on grounds of efficiency.
14 This 
model (Tables 3 and 4) is retained as the preferred specification in the following analysis. 
 
5.5 Cohort differences 
So far, we have pooled together two age cohorts in the analysis, primarily to obtain a larger sample 
and sufficient variation in program rules. However, health effects may become increasingly 
important as individuals age and the horizon approaches. To test this hypothesis, in Tables 9-12 
below individuals born in 1940 and 1945 are analysed separately. Treating the sub-samples as 
independent, t-tests of equality of health coefficients across cohorts are performed.  The results 
reveal that in no case are health coefficients different across cohorts, either for men or for women.  
However, the impact of economic variables could differ across cohorts but all these variables, 
annual income, wealth and the compensation rate, are estimated to be of the same magnitudes 
across cohorts for both men and women, except in the case of wealth for men. Still, as health effects 
                                                 
14The same result is obtained in a static context by Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) who are unable to reject the consistency 
of the least square estimator.   26 
are of equal importance to retirement planning to the two cohorts, we do not lose relevant 
information by pooling across cohorts for the purposes of this study. 
 
Table 9. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on retirement 
age. Men born in 1940. 
















































































2  (overall)  14.9 13.2 14.4 13.8 14.5 13.3 13.7 13.1
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  79*** 81*** 78*** 76*** 79*** 79*** 79*** 79***
Likelihood  ratio  test  101*** 104***  98*** 97*** 100*** 101*** 101*** 102***
Number of obs.  512 
Note: Additional controls include education, cohabitation including age differences between partners, experience, 
occupation, sector, tenure, hours of work, physical demanding job, job satisfaction and a dummy variable for missing 
values for compensation rate. The likelihood ratio tests are obtained from the maximum-likelihood random-effects 
estimator, which produce estimates that are very nearly the same as those produced by the full-information G2SLS 
estimator. See also Table 1 for notes. (*) Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% 
level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 10. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on retirement 
age. Men born in 1945. 
















































































2  (overall)  22.7 17.8 17.9 16.7 16.7 16.5 18.4 16.9
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  27*** 36*** 38*** 38*** 39*** 39*** 33*** 39***
Likelihood  ratio  test  30*** 39*** 42*** 42*** 43*** 44*** 37*** 43***
Number of obs.  712 
See Table 9 for notes. Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** 
significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table 11. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on retirement 
age. Women born in 1940. 
















































































2  (overall)  22.7 25.0 22.0 23.4 22.2 22.2 21.8 21.9
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  25*** 21*** 25*** 21*** 25*** 25*** 25*** 24***
Likelihood  ratio  test  28*** 24*** 28*** 24*** 28*** 28*** 29*** 28***
Number of obs.  406 
See Table 9 for notes. (*) Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** 
significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
 
Table 12. Random effects estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on retirement 
age. Women born in 1945. 
















































































2  (overall)  17.1 16.1 16.2 17.0 16.2 16.1 15.9 16.0
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  33*** 34*** 34*** 34*** 33*** 34*** 34*** 34***
Likelihood  ratio  test  36*** 37*** 37*** 36*** 36*** 37*** 37*** 37***
Number of obs.  576 
See Table 9 for notes. (*) Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** 
significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
5.6 Discontinuities in planned retirement age 
In previous studies, planned retirement age has been treated as a continuously distributed variable in 
econometric analyses, where researchers typically employ ordinary least squares methods in the 
analysis of its determinants. However, the descriptive evidence in most countries indicates that the 
distribution of planned retirement age peaks around the early and normal ages of retirement, or in 
the European context, is bunched around the ages of first eligibility of various labour market related 
exit programs.  In Denmark for example, several different regimes could be identified, consistent 
with the clustering at ages 60, 62 and 65, cf. Figure 2 above, which in turn reflect pension policy 
rules and eligibility criteria. Ages 60 and 67 are the early and the normal retirement ages in 1997,   28 
respectively, while in 2002 the normal retirement age is 65, following the 1999 reform. Several 
waiting incentives in the PEW program also make retirement at 60-61, 62 and 63-64 typical 
options. We distinguish therefore between six categories of planned retirement age: below 60, 60-
61, 62, 63-64, 65-66 and 67 and above. This allows us to adopt a random effects ordered probit 
model specification of the dependent variable, planned retirement age. 
 
Results of this estimation are shown in Tables 13 and 14 below.  Although we cannot formally test 
this model versus the ordinary random effects model, all estimated cut parameters are significant in 
these tables confirming the usefulness of this approach in the context of modelling retirement 
planning.  A further advantage, other than exploiting the clustering in the observed distribution of 
planned retirement age, is that adopting such an approach allows for impacts of health to vary by 
regime, reflecting pension policy reform that affects program age of eligibility or age-based 
incentives cf. Section 4. Therefore, we report marginal effects of health coefficients on retirement in 
these tables.  For purposes of compactness, we report aggregated marginal effects of the category 
62 and above for each significant health coefficient.
15 As is evident, results from the random effects 
ordered probit specification on both the health and the financial variables are qualitatively similar to 
those derived from the random effects specification (Tables 3 and 4). However, worse relative 
health for women and being hospitalised for a serious condition for men are only significant in the 
random effects ordered probit specification.  
 
Focusing on the significant health variables for men, quite large marginal effects are found for the 
subjective health measures. In fact, the probability of planning to retire at age 62 or later is reduced 
by 26-28 percentage points for poor general health, worse mental health and worse relative health, 
while having a disease condition or being hospitalised for a serious condition only reduces this 
probability by 13 percentage points. For comparison, a one-point increase in (log) individual 
income increases the probability by 20-22 percentage points. Since the impact of the broad 
subjective health measures again is found to be larger than the impact of income, the assessment of 
the relative importance of health is unchanged compared to what was derived from the random 
effects specification. 
                                                 
15 This is possible because marginal effects sum to zero as the probabilities sum to one. The dividing line is set between 
the categories 60-61 and 62 because for all variables in the tables the marginal effects change signs between these two 
categories. Separate marginal effects for each age category are available on request. Table 13. Random effects ordered probit estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on men’s retirement age. 
  Subjective health  Objective health 
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Log likelihood  -1724  -1734 -1733 -1738  -1739 -1739 -1734 -1737  
Number of obs.  1224 
Note: Marginal effects (ME) are calculated only for models in which the β estimate of the health measure is significant. In this case, ME refers to the change in the 
probability of having reported a retirement age at or above 62.  ME are based on the linear prediction from the estimated coefficients and are calculated at the mean 
values of the explanatory variables, while the two components of the error term εit (υit and ui) are set equal to zero. See also Table 1 for notes. * Significant at a 5% 
level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level.   30 
Table 14. Random effects ordered probit estimates of the effect of health and economic factors on women's retirement age. 
  Subjective health  Objective health 
  General health  Mental health Health  compared  to 
others 
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Log likelihood  -1141  -1142 -1144   -1139 -1144 -1144 -1146 -1146 
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 13 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level.For women, the income effect is only half the size of the effect for men. In fact, a one-point increase 
in (log) individual income only increases the probability to plan to retire at age 62 or later by 11-12 
percentage points. The effect of the significant health measures differs considerably ranging from a 
5 percentage points decrease if working incapacity is increased one point to a 25 percentage points 
reduction for worse mental health. The figures for poor general health and worse relative health are 
14 and 16 percentage points respectively. Here again, the relative importance of health to income is 
unchanged. Further, this analysis also suggests that health effects are not as strong as for men. The 
only exception is the effect of mental health.  
 
5.7 Disaggregated disease conditions and diagnoses 
The random effects ordered probit specification is useful in capturing discontinuities in planned 
retirement age, particularly in an environment of changing pension program eligibility criteria.  
However, in order to compare our findings to previous studies, we return to the random effects 
models in Tables 3 and 4 and disaggregate to the level of specific conditions and diagnosed diseases 
in order to obtain information about which particular illnesses can affect retirement plans.  The 
results of these analyses are given in Tables 15-18 below.  For men, myalgia and back problems 
significantly lowers planned retirement age by respectively 7 months and little more than a year, 
while for women, diseases conditions such as back problems, osteoporosis, and depression 
significantly hasten retirement, particularly the two latter conditions, by 6 months, 2 years and 
nearly a year respectively.  Being hospitalised for a serious condition does not appear to exert any 
appreciable effect, except in the case of heart diseases, which is marginally significant (10% level) 
for both men and women and lowers planned retirement age by 8 months and a year and 8 months 
respectively.
16 The limited effect of diagnoses might be due to the fact that individuals who have 
been hospitalised receive neutralizing treatment and therefore are able to continue to work. Another 
potential explanation is that people who suffer from a serious condition may in fact be advised by 
their doctors (or choose themselves) to continue working because of the potential therapeutic effects 
of work on health through engagement in a challenging and rewarding activity, the social contact 
with colleagues etc. Finally, a third explanation might be that these individuals’ retirement plans are 
                                                 
16 In comparison, McGarry (2002) does not find that specific conditions are significantly related to the probability of 
working beyond the age of 62, while Dywer and Mitchell (1999) find that limitations of daily living, back problems, 
head injuries and circulatory problems lower planned retirement age. Mental health (which is broader than depression) 
does not have a significant effect in their study and conditions such as osteoporosis and myalgia are not defined in their 
data. Thus, in part differences in findings are due to differences in data definitions and availability but back problems 
appear important in both their study and ours.   32 
affected but we do not capture this effect because of small sample size as the incidence of diagnoses 
is in general quite low. 
 
Table 15. Random effects estimates of the effect of disaggregated diseases conditions and 














































































2 (overall)  13.4 13.3  13.1 13.4 13.9 13.2 14.7  13.1
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  109*** 110*** 111*** 108*** 105*** 110***  107*** 110***
Likelihood ratio test  126*** 128***  129*** 126*** 122*** 128***  124***  128***
Number of obs.  1224 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 16. Random effects estimates of the effect of disaggregated diseases conditions and 














































































2 (overall)  16.1 16.0  16.0 16.0 16.0 17.4 16.7  16.7
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  67*** 68*** 68*** 68* 68*** 68***  66*** 66***
Likelihood ratio test  74*** 75***  75*** 75*** 75*** 74***  72***  72***
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table 17. Random effects estimates of the effect of disaggregated diagnoses and economic 




Strokes Cancers Lung 
diseases 
Diabetes High  blood 
pressure 
Arthritis 

























































2  (overall)  13.3 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  111*** 111*** 111*** 111*** 111*** 111*** 111***
Likelihood  ratio  test  129*** 129*** 129*** 129*** 130*** 129*** 129***
Number of obs.  1224 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table 18. Random effects estimates of the effect of disaggregated diagnoses and economic 
factors on women's retirement age. 
 Diagnoses 
 Heart   
conditions 
Strokes Cancers  Lung   
diseases 
Arthritis 









































2  (overall)  16.1 16.0 16.1 16.1 16.2
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  70*** 69*** 69*** 67*** 68***
Likelihood  ratio  test  76*** 75*** 75*** 74*** 74***
Number of obs.  892 
See Table 3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
 
5.8 Health changes 
So far, we have focused on the effect of the level of health on retirement planning. However, it 
might be that the effect of sudden or gradual changes in health is even larger than the effect of 
health status. Means for poor health and worsened health by changes in retirement plans is reported 
for men and women respectively in Table A8 and A9 in Appendix A3. For men as well as women, 
the share of individuals that plan to postpone retirement between the two waves is larger than the 
share that plan to retire earlier than originally planned and in general, the expected correlation 
between worsened health and hastened retirement is not found. Only the share of individuals that 
has been hospitalised for a serious condition is larger among individuals that bring retirement 
forward. This result indicates that diagnoses to a greater extent than the other health measures 
reflect health shocks.    34 
 
To examine these effects more closely, health changes occurring between the 1
st and 2
nd waves are 
included in the random effects estimations while still controlling for health status in wave 1, cf. 
Table 19 and 20 below. The results obtained from these analyses are not directly comparable to 
those derived from the analyses of the effect of health status (Tables 3 and 4) since these models are 
not nested. However, health changes seem to be important in particular in the case of men. Both 
worsened general and mental health hasten men’s planned retirement, while development of 
functional limitations lower women’s planned retirement age. Looking directly at the estimated 
coefficients for health changes, worsened general and mental health reduces men’s planned 
retirement age by 9 months and more than 2 years respectively, while development of functional 
limitations reduce this age by 1 year and 3 months for women. These results suggest that health 
shocks increase the propensity to hasten retirement. 
 
Table 19. Random effects estimates of the effect of health status, health changes and economic 
factors on men’s retirement age. 


































































































2  (overall)  16.9 14.4 14.3 14.1 13.1 13.2 15.0 13.2
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  101.1*** 107.8*** 108.2*** 109.4*** 110.5*** 111.1*** 106.1*** 110.9***
Likelihood ratio test  115.6***  124.5*** 124.9*** 126.2*** 128.3*** 128.8*** 122.2*** 128.7***
Number of obs.  1224 
Note: Health changes are defined as the differences between the values for health status in wave 1 and 2. See also Table 
3 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table 20. Random effects estimates of the effect of health status, health changes and economic 
factors on women's retirement age. 



































































































  17.6 17.0 16.5 18.0 16.6 16.7 16.2 16.1
Breusch-Pagan χ
2  64.1*** 65.6*** 67.3*** 63.6*** 66.9*** 66.7*** 68.1*** 68.2***
Likelihood ratio test  69.6***  71.4*** 73.4*** 68.8*** 72.9*** 72.6*** 74.3*** 74.4***
Number of obs.  982 
See Table 19 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
As is evident, results on both health status and financial variables are qualitatively similar to those 
derived from the analyses of the effect of health status. However, working capacity for men and 
work limitations for women are only significant when health changes are included. Similarly, 
inclusion of health changes in general increases the effect of health status while the effect of income 
remains unchanged. That is, including health changes does not change the assessment of the relative 
importance of health compared to income. Further, this analysis also suggests that health effects are 
stronger for men than for women. In general, these results strengthen the conclusion that health is 
important when retirement age is planned.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Using a wide array of alternative health measures including both self-reported and diagnostic 
measures extracted from LPR records, we compare the role of subjectively versus objectively 
measured health as a determinant of retirement planning, after controlling for income, labour 
market, job and background characteristics. The sample consists of older workers and retirees 
drawn from a Danish panel survey from 1997-2002 that is merged to longitudinal register data.  
Extending the existing literature, we estimate a panel model of retirement planning that controls 
both for unobserved heterogeneity as well as accounts for endogeneity and measurement error of 
health in retirement, and estimate separate models for men as well as women.  We find that self-
rated health is both an important predictor of retirement as well as a valid measure of health. Our 
analysis therefore brings fresh evidence to the debate initiated by earlier U.S. studies based on the   36 
older Retirement History Longitudinal Survey (RHS) data. These studies concluded that the use of 
self-reported health in retirement models was likely to yield an unreliable impact of health on 
retirement due to “justification bias”. However, our study, like more recent U.S. studies based on 
the newer HRS data find little support for this hypothesis and neither endogeneity nor measurement 
error turn out to be important sources of concern in the Danish data.   
 
Unobserved heterogeneity however, turns out to be important and estimates from random effects 
models show that self-rated physical and mental health are important predictors of retirement 
planning, in fact at least as important as economic factors, both among men as well as among 
women.  However, health seems to be relatively more influential in men’s retirement planning. 
Being in poor general health or poor mental health significantly reduces planned retirement age for 
both men and women. Other health measures, in particular having health worse than others or 
having a disease for men and a reduction in working capacity for women, also lower planned 
retirement age significantly. At a disaggregated level, back problems and myalgia significantly 
hasten male retirement, while back problems and particularly osteoporosis and depression are 
significant factors triggering retirement among women.  Retirement planning is in general 
unaffected by being hospitalised for a serious condition, except in the case of hospitalisation for 
heart diseases, which reduces planned retirement age for both men and women, but only marginally 
so. Looking at health changes strengthens the conclusion that health is an important factor in 
retirement planning. In fact, health shocks seem to increase the propensity to retire earlier. 
However, as expected, health seems to be less important for retirement planning in Denmark 
compared to the US due to the subsidized and fully-covered health care system and the easier access 
to health-related exit. 
 
As stated above, results suggest that health has the strongest effect on men’s retirement planning. 
According to Danø et al. (1999) one possible explanation of this gender difference is that men to a 
greater extent than women are employed in jobs that are inconsistent with poor health.
17 Another 
explanation might be that the gender difference is due to sample selection. That is, women outside 
the labour force in wave 1 suffered from poor health to a greater extent than similar men. However, 
this hypothesis is not confirmed when looking at the means for the health measures for these two 
                                                 
17 Tentatively, we have tested this hypothesis by interacting each of the eight health measures with dummy variables for 
private sector and physical demanding job respectively. However, no systematic difference between men and women 
appeared.   37
groups, cf. Table A1 in Appendix A3. In fact, women outside the labour seem to be at least as 
healthy as similar men. However, this might be due to the fact that a relatively large share of 
women retired from the labour market through TBP in the mid-nineties, cf. Section 2. Since access 
to this program did not depend on health criteria, retirement through this program probably implied 
that the average level of health among women outside the labour force was higher than it would 
otherwise have been. In other words, the sample selection problem might be hidden due to the high 
take-up rate of a particular early retirement program in the mid-nineties among relatively healthy 
women.  
 
If the identified effect of health on retirement planning in Denmark reflected an exploitation of the 
Danish welfare system by individuals in the labour force using failing health as an excuse for early 
retirement, our conclusions would lead to the policy recommendation of a less generous welfare 
system as a way of postponing retirement among older workers in the labour force. However, the 
identified effect of health seems to be real since justification bias does not appear to be a problem. 
Further, the fact that only selected, and not all health measures are found to have a significant 
effects confirms this interpretation. Therefore, on the basis of our findings, the policy 
recommendation would be to expand preventive and neutralizing health care services. A particular 
effort should be directed toward preventing diseases such as osteoporosis, depression, back 
problems and myalgia.  
 
All in all, our results confirm that health is an important determinant of preferences for retirement 
and that poor health causes workers to retire earlier. Finally, by estimating separate models for 
women as well as men, we add to the existing knowledge about the impact of health on retirement 
behaviour of older workers in the population. 
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Appendix A1. Health measures 
Both survey and register based health measures are included in our data. Subjective health measures 
are obtained from the survey while more objective health measures are obtained from both surveys 
and registers. 
 
The subjective health measures from the survey are self-rated. These are: 
•  General health: “All in all, how would you assess you current health? This variable is equal 
to one, if the answer is “very poor”, “poor” or “somewhat poor” and zero otherwise (“good” 
or “very good”).  
•  Mental health: An index for health is created by counting the number of mental 
problems/conditions present such as memory loss, fear, anxiety, depression and loneliness. 
•  Health compared to others: “How do you think your health is relative to others at your age?” 
This variable is equal to one, if the answer is “worse than others” and zero otherwise 
(“better than others” or “like others”). 
•  Working capacity: “If we say that your working capacity was given 10 points when it was at 
its highest level, how many points would you give your working capacity today?” This scale 
has been inverted.  Consequently, one point is the maximum, while ten points is the 
minimum. 
 
The objective health measures obtained from survey and registers are split into four categories: 
work limitations, functional limitations, doctor diagnosed diseases and hospitalisation due to 
specific diseases: 
•  Work limitations: “Do you find it difficult to do your job due to impairment of memory or 
concentration, reduced sight or hearing, tiredness, low spirits or lack of sleep?” A dummy 
variable for work limitations is set equal to one, if the individual suffers from at least one of 
these problems. 
•  Functional limitations: A dummy variable is set equal to one if the individual normally has 
difficulties cutting toe nails, climbing stairs, walking around outdoors or inside the home, 
getting washed or putting on clothes or shoes.   40 
•  Diseases: “Has a doctor told you that you have – or within the last year have had – high 
blood pressure, diabetes, bronchitis/asthma, osteoarthritis, myalgia, osteoporosis/ 
decalcification of bones, back problems or depression?” If yes: “Does this disease bother 
you in normal everyday life?” A dummy for diseases is set equal to one if at least one of 
these diseases bothers the individual in normal everyday life. 
•  Diagnoses: Information about diagnoses is obtained from registers. A dummy variable for 
diagnoses is set equal to one if the individual has been hospitalised for either heart 
conditions, stroke, cancer, lung disease, diabetes, high blood pressure or arthritis.
18 
  
The instruments for health are: 
•  Discharges: Number of discharges. 
•  Physician visits: Number of physician visits. 
•  Accident etc.: Hospitalisation due to accident, attack or self-inflicted injury. 
•  Parent alive: At least one of the parents alive 
•  Assistance with work at home: Have received assistance from children, family or friends 
(not cohabitants) with cleaning, washing, shopping, cooking or keeping up the house or the 
garden. 
•  Assistance with transportation etc.: Have received assistance from children, family or 
friends (not cohabitants) with money affairs, contact to authorities, getting to examinations, 
treatment etc. or going outside, going on a visit or getting to leisure activities. 
•  No exercise: Exercise includes walking or cycling at least half an hour, doing gymnastics, 
doing any sport or taking dancing lessons. On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = daily, 5 = never). 
 
The instruments discharges, physician visits, accidents etc. are based on information from registers, 
while parent alive, assistance with work at home, assistance with transportation etc. and exercise are 
survey-based.
 19 
                                                 
18 For the first survey year, which is 1997, diagnoses are recorded on the basis of information for the period 1993 to 
1996, while in the case of the second survey year, which is 2002, diagnoses are recorded for the years 1998-2001. If 
retirement takes place between to two survey years, diagnoses are recorded based on information for the years between 
the first survey year and the retirement year. 
19 The number of discharges and physician visits are measured in year t-1, where year t is the survey year, or 
alternatively the retirement year if the respondent retires between the two survey years. Recording of accidents is 
carried out as diagnoses, cf. above. The survey-based instruments are measured in the two survey years. However, we 
do not know whether the answer given in 2002 by individuals that retire between the two survey years is related to the 
situation before or after the actual retirement year. We assume that this information is related to the before situation.   41
Appendix A2. Compensation rate 
The compensation rate is estimated as the ratio of (potential) disposable income as a pensioner in 








t t participan a as income disposable
pensioner a as income disposable potential
rate on Compensati  
 
Year t is the survey year except when retirement takes place between two survey years. In these 
cases, year t is the actual retirement year (reported in the survey). The calculation is based on the 
first year as pensioner and is calculated as the sum of the two sources: The estimated amount of 
(potential) private pension and income from what respondents state as their expected most 
important income source when retired. 
 
To estimate potential disposable income as a pensioner, the amount of private pension, which is a 
lump-sum retirement income payment, is equally distributed over the years from the planned or 
actual retirement age until the mean life expectancy for the age and gender group in question. 
Unfortunately, some people are not aware of the payable amount. Namely, 3 out of 4 in the sample 
reported that they could receive a private pension when they stop working. However, only 66 per 
cent of this group reported the expected payable amount although a ball park figure was acceptable. 
 
The information about the expected most important income source when retired is based on the 
survey question: "What do you think is your most important income source at the time, when you 
stop working?" The possible answers are
20: 
•  Post Employment Wage (PEW, efterløn),  
•  Social Disability Pension (SDP, førtidspension),  
•  National Old Age Pension (OAP, folkepension),  
•  Labour market pension,  
•  Private pension,  
•  Private savings,  
•  Income of the spouse,  
                                                 
20 For more information about these schemes, see Larsen (2004).   42 
•  Own earnings and  
•  Other sorts of income. 
 
In case of planned retirement, these answers are applied directly in the calculation, while in case of 
actual retirement these answers only are applied directly if they are consistent with the retirement 
age. An example of inconsistent information is retirement at age 58 and PEW as the most important 
income source when retired. In cases of planned or actual retirement where the answers are labour 
market pension, private pension, private savings or other sorts of income, no information about 
income is available.
21 If information is inconsistent or no information is available, we assume that 
SDP is the retirement scheme for individuals that plan to or actually retire before the age of 60, 
PEW is assumed to be the retirement scheme for individuals that plan to or actually retire at age 60-
66, while OAP is assumed to be the retirement scheme for individuals that plan to retire at age 67 or 
later. This corresponds to the approach applied in Pedersen & Smith (1996). 
 
The income for potential recipients of PEW benefits is calculated as 90 per cent of earnings in year 
t-1 subject to a ceiling, which differs depending on whether unemployment insurance is on a full-
time or a part-time basis. For some of the self-employed, the registered income in year t-1 is 
negative. In these cases, benefits are set equal to the ceiling. For retirement after 1999, income is 
calculated as 91 per cent of full benefits for individuals that plan to or actual retire at age 60 or 61.
22 
 
Estimation of income for recipients of SDP benefits is more complicated. First of all, different 
levels of SDP are taken into consideration: highest level, intermediate level, increased ordinary 
level and ordinary level. In addition, we distinguish between men and women and between singles 
and partnered individuals. For recipients of SDP in our sample, information about the level of SDP 
is unknown. Therefore, the distribution on the four levels of SDP for each year for men and women 
respectively is obtained from Statistics Denmark (1997-2002), which includes yearly information 
about award of SDP. Since the distribution on the four levels of SDP found in Statistics Denmark 
(1997-2002) is not broken down by family type, an assumption has to be made. We assume that the 
                                                 
21 An exception is private pension, cf. above. However, as mentioned above, information about the payable amount is 
sometimes missing. Further, in many cases the payable amount is too small to be the only source of income. Therefore, 
if seems reasonable to add a second income source to individuals in this group. 
22 These changes were part of the PEW reform that was conducted in the middle of 1999, see Larsen (2004). Due to the 
age composition of our sample, these changes are not taken into account until 2000.   43
distribution on these four levels is the same for singles and partnered individuals. These 
distributions are used as weights to calculate yearly average SDP benefit for each of the four 
groups.  
  
To estimate an average measure for income as a pensioner for people in the category OAP, three 
types of OAP benefits are taken into account: Base amount, supplementary amount and special 
supplementary amount. In addition, distinctions are made between singles and married individuals 
and between men and women. For each of these four groups, the composition of OAP benefits for 
each year for an average recipient is identified on the basis of yearly information about receipts of 
OAP obtained from Statbank Denmark. Some recipients receive a reduced supplementary amount. 
The rate of reduction is unknown but we assume that it is 50 per cent on average. 
 
Yearly information about benefit levels and ceilings for PEW, SDP and OAP is found in Lausten 
(2001) and Danish Insurance Information Service (2001, 2002). 
 
If the expected most important income source is income of the spouse, the (potential) income is 
estimated as half of the spouse's earnings in year t. If own earnings is the expected most income 
source, the income is set equal to the respondent's earnings in year t.  
 
The estimate of the denominator, disposable income as a participant, which is based on earnings in 
year t-1, is described in Pedersen & Smith (1996). 
  
A variable for missing compensation rate is added. That is, compensation rate is set equal to 
missing, if the estimated rate is equal to or below 0 because a negative compensation rate is 
assumed to be invalid. In addition, the compensation rate is set equal to missing if this rate is in 
excess of 1.5. Since all individuals in the sample are in the labour force before retirement, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the disposable income as a pensioner in year t at its highest is 50 per cent 
higher than the disposable income as a participant in year t-1. The missing compensation rate 
variable is set equal to 1, if the compensation rate is missing and 0 otherwise.   44 
Appendix A3. Tables 
 
Table A1. 
Means of variables by labour force (LF) status, men and women (standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
  In LF Wave 1  Out of LF Wave 1 
  Men Women Men Women 
Planned Retirement Age  61.68  (2.67) 60.86 (2.22) - -  -  -
Poor health    
General health  0.18
e  (0.38) 0.17
e  (0.37) 0.64 (0.48) 0.55  (0.50)
Mental health  1.21
ge  (0.20) 1.24
e  (0.20) 1.43 (0.39) 1.37  (0.33)
Health compared to others  0.05
e  (0.22) 0.05
e  (0.21) 0.47 (0.50) 0.35  (0.48)
Working capacity  2.35 (1.51) 2.28 (1.59) - -  -  -
Work limitations  0.19 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) - -  -  -
Functional limitations 0.03
ge  (0.17) 0.05
e  (0.22) 0.35 (0.48) 0.32  (0.47)
Diseases Conditions  0.22
ge  (0.42) 0.32
e  (0.47) 0.50 (0.50) 0.55  (0.50)
- High blood pressure  0.02
e  (0.14) 0.02
e  (0.15) 0.10 (0.29) 0.06  (0.23)
- Diabetes  0.01
e  (0.08) 0.00
e  (0.03) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02  (0.14)
- Bronchitis/asthma  0.02
e  (0.14) 0.03
e  (0.16) 0.06 (0.24) 0.11  (0.32)
- Osteoarthritis  0.11
ge  (0.31) 0.15
e  (0.36) 0.29 (0.45) 0.35  (0.48)
- Myalgia  0.09
ge  (0.28) 0.17
e  (0.37) 0.21 (0.41) 0.26  (0.44)
- Osteoporosis/ decalcification of bones  0.00
ge  (0.04) 0.02
e  (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.07  (0.26)
- Back problems  0.10
e  (0.30) 0.12
e  (0.32) 0.30 (0.46) 0.29  (0.45)
- Depression  0.02
ge  (0.12) 0.03
e  (0.17) 0.14 (0.35) 0.10  (0.30)
Diagnoses 0.07
ge  (0.26) 0.03
e  (0.18) 0.17 (0.38) 0.11  (0.31)
- Heart conditions  0.03
ge  (0.18) 0.00
e  (0.06) 0.09 (0.29) 0.03  (0.16)
- Strokes  0.00
e  (0.06) 0.00 (0.05) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01  (0.07)
- Cancers  0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.02  (0.13)
- Lung diseases  0.01
e  (0.08) 0.01
e  (0.08) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02  (0.14)
- Diabetes  0.00
g  (0.06) 0.00
e  (0.00) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01  (0.11)
- High blood pressure  0.01
g  (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.11) 0.00  (0.04)
- Arthritis  0.01 (0.10) 0.01
e  (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03  (0.16)
Demographic characteristics    
Born in 1940  0.42
e  (0.49) 0.41
e  (0.49) 0.57 (0.50) 0.52  (0.50)
Vocational training  0.48
g  (0.50) 0.39
e  (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.30  (0.46)
Higher education   0.23
e  (0.42) 0.26
e  (0.44) 0.10 (0.31) 0.07  (0.25)
Living alone  0.10
ge  (0.31) 0.20
e  (0.40) 0.38 (0.49) 0.25  (0.43)
Partner at the same age
a) or older   0.48
e  (0.50) - - 0.31 (0.46) - -
Partner at the same age
 a) or younger  - - 0.46
e  (0.50) - - 0.40  (0.49)
Financial and job characteristics     
Log income, average of year t-1 and t-2
b)  12.4
ge  (0.54) 12.1
e  (0.41) 12.0 (0.61) 11.1  (2.88)
Wealth in year t-1 in 1,000,000 d.kr.  0.51
ge  (1.17) 0.20
e  (0.41) 0.22 (0.56) 0.13  (0.43)
Compensation rate in year t 0.46
c)g  (0.20) 0.57
d)  (0.19) - - - -
Compensation rate is missing  0.11
g  (0.31) 0.18 (0.38) - - - -
Experience 38.6
ge  (5.55) 34.5
e  (6.38) 33.2 (8.10) 29.3  (8.25)
Self-employed, assisting spouses etc.  0.13
g  (0.34) 0.10 (0.29) - - - -
Skilled, unskilled workers  0.34
g  (0.47) 0.15 (0.36) - - - -
Private sector  0.64
g  (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) - - - -
Tenure 17.5
g  (11.7) 16.5 (10.5) - - - -
Hours of work  40.7
g  (8.58) 34.3 (8.44) - - - -
Physical demanding job  0.49
g  (0.50) 0.57 (0.49) - - - -
Job satisfaction
e)  3.59 (1.46) 3.60 (1.44) - - - -
Number of observations  1224  982  230
f)  548
 f) 
Notes: a) “Same age”: +/- two years; baseline in each case is the most usual pattern b) In cases where earnings is less 
than zero, this information is replaced by information about surplus of own firm; c) 1093 observations; d) 808 
observations; e) “Would choose the current job again”: 1= yes, quite sure; 5 = no, certainly not; f) Number of 
observations differ for some variables due to missing values. 
gSignificant gender difference, p<0.05. 
eSignificant 
employed-not-employed difference, p>0.05.   45 
Table A2. 
























































































































































































































































































































































General health  1.00          
Mental health  0.32  1.00        
Health compared to 
others  0.38 0.17  1.00      
Working capacity  0.28  0.32  0.24  1.00     
Work limitations  0.19  0.28  0.16  0.24 1.00     
Functional limitations  0.26  0.11  0.29  0.12 0.07 1.00     
Diseases Conditions  0.30  0.20  0.29  0.24 0.15 0.09 1.00     
High blood pressure  0.06  0.08  0.13  0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.26 1.00     
Diabetes 0.02  -0.02  0.08  0.03 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.15 1.00     
Bronchitis/asthma 0.05  0.07 0.02  0.06 0.07 0.01 0.26 -0.02 -0.01 1.00     
Osteoarthritis 0.29  0.19 0.27  0.21 0.12 0.11 0.64 0.05 -0.03 0.01 1.00     
Myalgia 0.22  0.20  0.23  0.22 0.19 0.08 0.57 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.31 1.00    
Osteoporosis etc.  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.13  1.00    
Back problems  0.29  0.16  0.28  0.22 0.12 0.12 0.61 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.46 0.31  0.12 1.00    
Depression 0.06  0.27  0.00  0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.23 0.13 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.15  -0.01 0.09 1.00    
Diagnoses 0.14  0.06  0.14  0.08 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.05  -0.01 0.06 0.07 1.00    
Heart conditions  0.12  0.04  0.13  0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06  -0.01 0.06 0.12 0.68 1.00    
Strokes 0.01  -0.01  0.05  0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.21 -0.01 1.00    
Cancers 0.00  0.01  -0.02  -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.35 -0.02 -0.01 1.00    
Lung diseases  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.30 0.04 0.00 -0.01 1.00    
Diabetes 0.00  0.04  -0.01  -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.23 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 1.00    
High blood pressure  -0.01  -0.04  -0.02  0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03  0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.31 0.09 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.00   
Arthritis 0.12  0.05  0.12  0.09 0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.38 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
Number of observations: 1224.  46 
Table A3. 

























































































































































































































































































































































General health  1.00          
Mental health  0.24  1.00        
Health compared to 
others  0.41 0.16  1.00      
Working capacity  0.32  0.19  0.34  1.00     
Work limitations  0.19  0.32  0.17  0.23 1.00     
Functional limitations  0.26  0.18  0.31  0.17 0.16 1.00     
Diseases Conditions  0.36  0.21  0.24  0.22 0.21 0.14 1.00     
High blood pressure  0.12  0.05  0.13  0.07 0.05 0.09 0.22 1.00     
Diabetes 0.07  -0.04  -0.01  0.07 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.00 1.00     
Bronchitis/asthma 0.09  0.00 0.20  0.00 0.06 0.10 0.25 -0.03 -0.01 1.00     
Osteoarthritis 0.29  0.16 0.20  0.17 0.15 0.19 0.63 0.05 0.08 0.05 1.00     
Myalgia 0.26  0.15  0.09  0.14 0.13 0.04 0.66 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.34 1.00    
Osteoporosis  etc.  0.12 0.10  0.25 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.18 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.08 1.00    
Back  problems  0.34 0.19  0.18 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.53 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.39 0.36 0.16 1.00    
Depression  0.22 0.30  0.14 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.25 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.15 1.00    
Diagnoses  0.18 0.02  0.32 0.12 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 1.00    
Heart  conditions  0.10  -0.03  0.14 0.10 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.35 1.00    
Strokes 0.04  0.02  0.10  0.05 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.25 0.00 1.00    
Cancers 0.05  0.02  0.11  0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.05  -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.61 -0.01 -0.01 1.00    
Lung  diseases  0.06  -0.05  0.10 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.21 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.46 0.18 0.00 0.10 1.00    
Diabetes  . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
High blood pressure  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .   
Arthritis 0.16  0.06  0.29  0.08 0.11 0.27 0.12 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.05 0.52 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 . . 1.00 
Number of observations: 982. 
Note: All the values for the diagnoses diabetes and high blood pressure are missing because none of the women in the sample have been hospitalised due to these 
diseases.Table A4. 
First-stage random effects IV estimates of health equations, men. 




































































































































































2 test for power of 
instruments 125***  129***  93*** 138*** 70*** 48**  103***  145***
Number of obs.  1224 
Note: Additional controls include individual earnings, wealth, compensation rate and a dummy variable for missing 
values for compensation rate, birth cohort, education, cohabitation including age differences between partners, 
experience, occupation, sector, tenure, hours of work, physical demanding job and job satisfaction. 
* Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
 
Table A5. 
First-stage random effects IV estimates of health equations, women. 




































































































































































2 test for power of 
instruments 63***  103***  81*** 115*** 42* 48**  100**  224***
Number of obs.  982 
See Table A4 for notes. * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table A6. Test of overidentifying restrictions, men (standard error in parentheses). 
















conditions  Diagnoses 
RE                
















                
REIV                
All instruments              

















test  0.63 2.51 1.57 1.94 2.94 1.79 3.32  1.32 
            
Minus parent alive              

















test  0.58 2.89 1.53 2.21 2.95 1.79 3.40  1.34 
           
Minus number of discharges            

















test  0.55 2.49 1.61 2.54 3.93 1.16 2.97  5.80 
           
Minus number of physician visits          

















test  0.25 0.12 0.22  10.71  16.47 0.71  4.44 0.55 
           
Minus home work assistance            

















test 0.81  2.55  2.01  1.95 3.16  2.13  3.31  1.29 
           
Minus transportation assistance etc.            

















test 0.97  2.86  1.49  2.40 2.67  1.89  3.20  1.30 
            
Minus accident etc.              

















test 0.86  2.01  1.74  2.23 2.40  2.47  3.17  1.32 
            
Minus no exercise              

















test 1.90  3.30  2.33  2.08 2.90  2.00  3.55  1.30 
(*) Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level.   49
Table A7. Test of overidentifying restrictions, women (standard error in parentheses). 
















conditions  Diagnoses 
RE               
















               
REIV               
All instruments              

















test  1.48 1.25 n.a.  0.59  0.79 2.28  n.a. n.a. 
              
Minus parent alive            

















test  0.87 0.74 n.a.  0.09  0.65 2.30  n.a. n.a. 
          
Minus number of discharges            

















test  1.47 1.37 n.a.  0.57  0.80 2.75  n.a. 3.30 
          
Minus number of physician visits            

















test  4.62 1.10 n.a.  n.a.  0.90 1.44  n.a. 0.06 
          
Minus home work assistance            

















test 0.91  1.22  n.a.  0.62 0.76 2.22  n.a. 0.00 
          
Minus transportation assistance etc.            

















test 1.39  2.10  3.69  1.54 1.24 2.38  2.37 0.03 
              
Minus accident etc.           

















test 1.29  5.65  n.a.  0.11 0.84 1.30  1.80 0.00 
              
Minus no exercise              

















test 2.28  0.72  n.a.  1.29 1.12 7.72  2.25 0.01   
(*) Significant at a 10% level, * Significant at a 5% level, ** significant at a 1% level, *** significant at a 0.1% level. 
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Table A8. Means for health variables by changes in (planned) retirement age, men (standard 
deviations in parentheses). 
      Changes in (planned) retirement age 
  All Wave  1R > Wave 2R Wave  1R = Wave 2R Wave  1R < Wave 2R 
Poor general health                
Both waves  0.12 (0.32) 0.18 (0.39) 0.15 (0.35) 0.06 (0.25)
Wave 2 Only  0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.17) 0.08 (0.27) 0.05 (0.21)
Worsened mental health    
Wave 1 to wave 2  0.24 (0.43) 0.16 (0.37) 0.23 (0.42) 0.30 (0.46)
Worse health than others    
Both waves  0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.19) 0.01 (0.09)
Wave 2 Only  0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.14)
Reduced working capacity    
Wave 1 to wave 2  0.24 (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.40) 0.29 (0.45)
Work limitations    
Both waves  0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34) 0.06 (0.25)
Wave 2 Only  0.09 (0.28) 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.22) 0.13 (0.34)
Functional  limitations    
Both waves  0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.09)
Wave 2 Only  0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.11)
Diseases conditions    
Both waves  0.14 (0.35) 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) 0.09 (0.29)
Wave 2 Only  0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.32)
Diagnoses    
Both waves  0.01 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.11)
Wave 2 Only  0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.03 (0.18)
Number of observations  612             136               211            265 
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Table A9. Means for health variables by changes in (planned) retirement age, women 
(standard deviations in parentheses). 
      Changes in (planned) retirement age 
 All  Wave  1R > Wave 2R Wave  1R = Wave 2R Wave  1R < Wave 2R 
Poor general health    
Both waves  0.09 (0.29) 0.18 (0.38) 0.06 (0.23) 0.07 (0.26)
Wave 2 Only  0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.21) 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30)
Worsened mental health    
Wave 1 to wave 2  0.27 (0.44) 0.19 (0.39) 0.27 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46)
Worse health than others    
Both waves  0.02 (0.15) 0.06 (0.23) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Wave 2 Only  0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.14) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17)
Reduced working capacity    
Wave 1 to wave 2  0.27 (0.45) 0.15 (0.36) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46)
Work limitations    
Both waves  0.11 (0.32) 0.19 (0.39) 0.11 (0.31) 0.07 (0.26)
Wave 2 Only  0.09 (0.29) 0.01 (0.10) 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.33)
Functional  limitations    
Both waves  0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.28) 0.03 (0.18) 0.01 (0.08)
Wave 2 Only  0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11)
Diseases conditions    
Both waves  0.22 (0.42) 0.33 (0.47) 0.22 (0.41) 0.17 (0.38)
Wave 2 Only  0.10 (0.31) 0.06 (0.23) 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.32)
Diagnoses    
Both waves  0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.10) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Wave 2 Only  0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.13)
Number of observations  491               107                 208             176 
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